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Abstract: Changes in Dismissal Protection Legislation in Germany have been a subject to ongoing
research in the past decade. The majority of these studies, however, has not been able to determine
signi¯cant e®ects on job and worker °ows in ¯rms a®ected by the reforms. We estimate the impact of
dismissal protection on individual employment stability using the 1999 reform as a "natural experi-
ment". We provide insights into the e®ects of legislation on the ¯rms' matching behaviour. Our results
hint at increased job security after the reform for those spells a®ected by it. This rise in stability was,
however, accompanied by modest instability at start suggesting that ¯rms facing additional ¯ring costs
tend to cease probation to shed unproductive job-worker matches. The latter e®ect, however, was not
found to be signi¯cant.
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According to the OECD (1999), Germany ranks among the countries with the most highly
regulated labour markets in the Western hemisphere. A topic subject to ongoing debate in
this context is the question about the e®ects of dismissal protection legislation on the hiring
and separation behaviour of ¯rms. This paper investigates the role of the German Protection
Against Dismissal Act (PADA) on the stability of covered employment spells.
We provide new insights into these e®ects as previous studies have focused almost exclu-
sively on aggregate (¯rm-level) outcomes. We track employment spells individually to determine
whether a particular employment spell is or is not a®ected by legislation. Similar to previous
research, we exploit changing provisions for a particular ¯rm size category as a natural exper-
iment to identify the protective e®ect of the law. Unlike previous studies, however, we do not
compare aggregate worker and job °ows, but the evolvement of individual job stability over the
duration of the job.
This approach has several advantages compared to former research. First, our setup
allows us to concentrate speci¯cally on short-term spells. Due to transition periods granted to
existing employment relationships, it is typically the case that legislative changes a®ect only
newly begun employment spells. While aggregate worker and job °ows cannot account for this
fact, we are able to examine short-term spells exclusively. Second, we are able to account for
changes in applicability of the law a®ecting the ¯rm due to employment thresholds. In order to
compute aggregate worker and job °ows, previous studies had to categorise each ¯rm statically
at the beginning of each time frame before and after the reform, thereby ignoring switches
between di®erent ¯rm size categories. We argue, however, that a continuous determination of
the ¯rm size may be crucial as a substantial number of ¯rms in our sample alters its workforce
due to (i) strategic action or (ii) seasonal °uctuations. These switches between treatment
and control group may lead to misclassi¯cations of ¯rms and cause attenuation bias. Third,
our data allow to control for the use of ¯xed-term contracts at the company (albeit not at
the individual) level. If employment protection is introduced, ¯rms could substitute regular
employment by ¯xed-term contracts. This behaviour may neutralize the estimated impact of
employment protection on gross mobility rates and lead to the false assertion that there is no
causal e®ect of dismissal protection on protected employment spells.
According to German legal practice, employers' separation costs strongly depend on
workers' job tenure since compensation payments enforced by courts in case of unfair dismissal
increase with employment duration. By focussing on short-term spells, we, therefore, investigate
the minimum impact of German employment protection on job separations.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether newly begun spells have experienced
1a change in stability after becoming subject to the provisions of the PADA. Focusing on short-
term spells, we provide insights into changes of the matching process once legislation becomes
applicable. According to basic job matching theory, additional ¯ring costs implied by the law
lead to an increase in overall job security for those spells a®ected by it. This e®ect, however,
should come at the cost of initial instability during a probation or waiting period in which the
law does not yet apply. In this period, ¯rms facing additional ¯ring expenses for long-term
spells tend to shed unproductive job-worker matches with higher intensity (Boockmann and
Hagen, 2007).
We present some ¯rst results on these issues. They tend to be supportive to the theory,
although their robustness does not appear to be very strong. In particular, there is little evi-
dence of more mobility within the probationary period. By focussing attentions on separations
and not on hirings, we disregard possible e®ects of employment protection on hirings in some
of our interpretations. However, the notion that the e®ects on hirings are minor is given some
support in the recent empirical literature on Germany (Bauer, Bender, and Bonin, 2004).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we give a brief
overview of the main characteristics of German Dismissal Protection Legislation. We then turn
to previous research in that ¯eld of literature (section 3). In section 4, we introduce the dataset
used in our analysis. We present the methodology in section 5, followed by the discussion of
our main ¯ndings (section 6). Finally, a conclusion is provided in section 7.
2 Legislative Framework
The Protection Against Dismissal Act (PADA ¡ "KÄ undigungsschutzgesetz - KSchG") is the
main source of legal employment protection in Germany1.
According to the law, employers may only terminate employment spells if they are able
to justify this by one of the three following principal reasons (Article 1 KSchG):
1. dismissals on grounds of personal incapability or health problems,
2. dismissals as a consequence of bad conduct, and
3. redundancies, i.e. separations due to operational reasons.
Regarding the fact that the employer has the burden of proof, it is not surprising that dismissals
due to bad conduct or personal incapability are relatively rare. A common opinion is that
employers tend to appeal to the third reason, as this may be the most convenient way to
1Some statutory protection against dismissal is also provided by the German Civil Code ("BÄ urgerliches Gesetz-
buch") in Articles 611 - 630, which de¯nes the general terms of dismissal (e.g. the period of notice the
employer is required to adhere to). In addition to the general employment protection provided by the
PADA, there are also speci¯c mandates for groups such as women before childbirth or disabled persons.
2comply with the law. According to Article 102 of the Works Constitution Act, he also has to
give additional notice to the works council (in case such an institution is installed), which has
to agree upon the proposed dismissal plan.
If the dismissed worker believes that the employer cannot justify the dismissal by one of
the above criteria, he or she may take legal action. Labour Courts then have to judge on the ad-
equacy of the dismissal and may, in the extreme case, rescind dismissals for fairness reasons. In
case of redundancies, "social criteria" (Article 1 para. 3 of the PADA) such as age, employment
duration and maintenance obligations have to be met. The concept of fair dismissal has been
predominantly shaped by case law, which is of importance insofar as it is up to the employer
to prove that all legal duties regarding fairness have been met2. As this may be a di±cult
task, legal cases often end in court settlements such that the employee receives a compensa-
tion payment from the employer in return for the termination of the employment relationship.
Compensation payments generally increase with the number of years the individual has been
employed at the ¯rm. According to HÄ ummerich (1999), a rule of thumb followed by Labour
Courts when settling legal cases is to grant half the monthly wage for each year of seniority.
Therefore, exceeding the threshold value does not prohibit a company from dismissing workers,
but rather raises its costs for lay-o®s signi¯cantly. In particular, short-term spells are protected
to a much smaller degree than long-standing employment relationships. Moreover, there is a
waiting period of six months of tenure before dismissal protection can be claimed.
According to Koller (2005), German legislation counts more than 160 ¯rm size threshold
values governing the relationship between employers and employees. In the case of the PADA, a
large part of its provisions applies only beyond a ¯rm size threshold, while only some provisions
such as dismissal of works council members a®ects all ¯rms. The threshold for applicability
has changed back and forth several times in recent history. In an attempt to tackle high
German structural unemployment, the government led by Chancellor Kohl (centre-right) raised
the threshold to ten full-time equivalent employees on 1st October 1996 (Article 23 para. 1
sentence 2 of the PADA). The legislator did, however, grant a preliminary protection of the
status quo ("Vertrauensschutz") passing a decree that rendered spells that had begun before
October 1996 subject to prior legislation (where the threshold value stood at ¯ve employees).
This exception was due to expire on 30th September 1999.
A political swing to centre-left under Chancellor SchrÄ oder did, however, render this
2According to Jahn and Schnabel (2003), 27% of all dismissals ¯led by employers in 2001 ended up before
court. At the same time, 75 to 80% of all lawsuits concerning unjusti¯ed dismissals were ruled in favour of
the employee. Regarding the fact that costs involved in lawsuits are relatively low compared to international
standards (see Jahn, 2002), it becomes apparent that the PADA inherits substantial incentive to take legal
action. If the employee is represented by a trade union or if he disposes of a legal expenses insurance, then
no monetary costs arise from the trial.
3exemption rule obsolete. The threshold value was again set down to ¯ve employees, this time
allowing for no transition period. In addition, the newly elected government changed the
weighting scheme in a manner that implicitly raised the number of workers employed at a ¯rm.
The revised act became e®ective on 1st January 1999 (see Table 1).
A di±cult subject is the determination of the headcount used in deciding whether the
threshold is exceeded. The threshold refers to establishments, i.e. a production unit at a single
location which may economically and legally depend on other units3. The PADA thereby refers
explicitly to all employees who work regularly in the company ("In Betrieben und Verwaltungen,
in denen in der Regel zehn oder mehr Arbeitnehmer ... beschÄ atigt sind..."; Article 23 of the
PADA). Thus, emphasis on the long-term employment level comprises dismissed workers and
requires knowledge about past and future evolvement. According to the Federal Labour Court,
this knowledge should reach beyond the pure computation of annual averages, but should
also comprise future trends in employment (Bundesarbeitsgericht (31/01/1991); Az: 2 AZR
356/90).
Individuals are considered based on a full-time equivalent calculation. Thus, workers
with an hours margin less than full-time are weighted according to an explicit allocation in
the act (see Table 1). It is irrelevant for the headcount whether the employee is hired on a
permanent or a ¯xed-term contract since this feature does not a®ect the juridical existence
of an agreement between the employer and the employee. The act does, however, explicitly
exclude employees on vocational training as the legislator does intend to promote this form
of worker formation. Moreover, the PADA explicitly excludes non-dependent employees. This
comprises owners, consultants and family members without a labour contract. By contrast,
executives and managers authorized to hire and dismiss employees are explicitly included in
the computation as they remain in a dependent position within the ¯rm.
3 Previous Research
Over the last decade, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) has attracted the interest of
labour economists and policy makers alike, in particular concerning the e®ects on aggregate
labour markets. Literature thereby has progressed from a cross-country and macro to a single-
country and micro perspective.
Some important cross-country studies emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. Bertola
(1990), for example, found a negative correlation between the variance of employment growth
and job security rankings using data which ranged from the 1960s to the mid 1980s. Yet, his
3Exemptions are made for ¯rms of the navigation or the aviation sector and for private households operating
as employers.
4¯ndings can only be considered consistent with theoretical predictions if countries are similar
in all respects other than the stringency of EPL4. Using a sample of 20 countries over the
period of 1956 to 1984, Lazear (1990) studies the e®ect of severance pay requirements on
employment. The results suggest that the level of severance pay is negatively correlated with the
employment-population ratio and labour force participation rate, and positively correlated with
unemployment. In contrast, Addison and Grosso (1996) ¯nd no signi¯cant evidence between
EPL and unemployment using the same data but corrected for a number of de¯ciencies. Both
results could be in line with theory: while theory predicts that a given set of legal provisions
should a®ect movements in employment, there is no general result for the level of employment
or unemployment.
The evidence uncovered by this early empirical work, while not as univocal as theo-
retical models would predict, o®ers much useful information as to the implications of EPL
for employment dynamics and its interaction with other institutional and economic features
of industrialised economies. Yet, despite the undoubted achievements, researchers highlighted
several critical issues regarding these ¯rst studies such as the availability of comparable cross-
country data, the di±culty to capture legislative complexity in aggregate measures, or the
issue of di®erences in the enforcement of legislation among countries (e.g. Bertola, Boeri, and
Cazes, 1999; Boeri, 1996). Therefore, Addison and Teixeira (2001) came to the "inescapable
conclusion... that there is a pressing need to supplement the aggregate studies with industry and
especially ¯rm data." (p. 38)
Shifting the focus to a ¯rm-level perspective, researchers paid particular attention to the
cases of Italy and Spain, where dismissal protection regulations are known to be particularly
tight. Borgarello, Garibaldi, and Pacelli (2003), for instance, investigate threshold e®ects in the
Italian case. The authors employ a dataset based on Italian Social Security Records (INPS) to
study a reform in Italian Dismissal Protection Legislation in 1990, which tightened regulations
for small ¯rms below the threshold5. Using a two-step approach, Borgarello et al. (2003)
¯nd that ¯rms a®ected by the policy change were signi¯cantly more reluctant to increase
employment as compared to corresponding ¯rms above the threshold. This persistence of small
¯rms was determined to be more likely after the reform in 1990.
Using a more comprehensive dataset, Schivardi and Torrini (2004) also research the
Italian case running a probit regression (dependent variable: positive employment changes)
to measure the e®ects of the threshold on growth propensity. Repeating the same exercise in
steady state using a stochastic transition matrix to assess the long-run e®ects of EPL, results
4In particular, if the dynamic volatility of labour demand and wages is similar in all countries.
5Unlike German studies, it was not possible for them to treat the policy change as a "natural experiment" as
this reform was accompanied by an additional reform in 1991.
5do con¯rm threshold dynamics, but e®ects are found to be very modest.
Boeri and Jimeno (2004) examine the relationship between strictness of EPL and job
loss probabilities. Using a dataset for the Italian case similar to Borgarello et al.'s (2003) on
the one hand, and the Spanish Labour Force Survey (household panel survey with a rotation
scheme) on the other, the authors ¯nd their results to be in line with the predictions of their
theoretical model. In Italy, workers in ¯rms exempted from EPL are more likely to be laid-o®.
In Spain, ¯rm size also matters both for lay-o® probabilities and reasons the employer alleges
at dismissal. Robustness checks are found to con¯rm the results. However, ¯ndings do not hold
for the hiring side, where Boeri and Jimeno (2004) were not able to reveal any discrete jumps
at the threshold.
Kugler and Pica (2005) use a di®erences-in-di®erences approach to exploit the increase
in costs of unfair dismissals in small relative to large ¯rms in the 1990 reform in Italy. The
authors compare worker and job °ows in small and large ¯rms before and after the reform. That
is, the authors examine individual job matches and their dissolutions on the one hand, and job
°ows "on the internal and external margin" (p. 2) on the other, referring to overall employment
changes as well as to market exits and entries of ¯rms. Unlike the studies mentioned before, they
¯nd quite robust and a±rming evidence for threshold e®ects (relative decrease of accessions
and separations decreased after the reform). Moreover, the reform is found to have exerted a
larger impact in industries that were found to be volatile before the reform. Also in line with
theoretical predictions, employment changes fell relatively in small ¯rms, and entry rates for
these companies decreased. Surprisingly though, the authors do not mention the issue of a
second reform in 1991 that may violate the parallel trend assumption and that was put forward
by Borgarello et al. (2003) as a reason why they did not exploit the time dimension.
Whereas international studies have found (albeit modest) evidence for the impact of
dismissal protection on employment composition and levels, single-country studies regarding
Germany have so far not con¯rmed a similar clear-cut pattern. Several recent surveys have
investigated the e®ects of the legislative changes in 1996 and 1999 (see previous section) de-
scriptively. A survey by the Deutsche Industrie- und Handelstag (DIHT, 1998), for instance,
found employment enhancing e®ects regarding the ¯rst reform in 1996. In line with this result,
another survey conducted by FORSA suggested a reduction in hirings in those ¯rms a®ected
by the second legislative change (IW, 2003, p. 2). Unlike these studies, however, Bielenski,
Hartmann, Pfarr, and Seifert (2003) did not ¯nd any supporting evidence for threshold e®ects
from a survey about modes and reasons for separations among employees. Obviously, these
surveys may only be regarded as a ¯rst, tentative glance at the topic due to their descriptive
character and the possibility of strategic answering present in this form of research.
Boockmann and Hagen (2001) suggest that °exible working forms such as freelance work,
6¯xed-term contracts (FTCs) and employees hired from Temporary Working Agencies serve as
means to adjust for °uctuations in demand. In particular, the authors determine evidence
for a decreased propensity to hire "atypical" labour for those ¯rms a®ected by the reform
in 1996 as this form of employment allowed to "evade" the provisions when the law applied.
One drawback of their analysis certainly is the limited observation period of FTCs before the
legislation change, which restricts variation in the sample. Verick (2004), in addition, expresses
doubts about the size of the treatment group (as existing spells were granted protection for a
transition period). This argument, however, does not seem to be entirely convincing. Although
the transition period regarding dismissals of existing spells may have a®ected new hirings to
some extent (as employers might have acted more cautiously), it is unlikely that this regulation
has completely o®set e®ects in the ¯rms' employment behaviour since this transition period did
not concern hirings. In a more recent study, Fritsch and Schank (2005) contest the ¯ndings of
Boockmann and Hagen (2001). Extending the observation period, they are not able to con¯rm
the results of reduced hiring probabilities for FTCs in ¯rms with six to ten employees during
the period from 1996 to 1998.
Another example for a recent empirical study evaluating threshold e®ects of German
employment legislation are KÄ olling, Schnabel, and Wagner (2001). The authors not only exam-
ine the e®ects of changes in the threshold of the PADA, but also in the legislation of the Severe
Disability Act (SDA)6. Unlike Boockmann and Hagen (2001), they do not determine threshold
e®ects with respect to the PADA. By contrast, KÄ olling et al. (2001) do ¯nd weak evidence
regarding decreased employment behaviour at the threshold of the SDA. Despite general issues
concerning studies researching job and worker °ows (see above), the study of KÄ olling et al.
(2001) may be criticised on a speci¯c ground. That is to say, the narrow de¯nition of ¯rm
groups appears to be highly critical regarding the approximations that are needed to categorise
¯rms. Even though KÄ olling et al. (2001) run several robustness checks with more distant groups,
the issue of narrow ¯rm classes cannot be entirely resolved as ¯rms may not use di®erent forms
of work uniformly7.
Using the IAB establishment panel for the years 1997 to 2001, Verick (2004) examines
the impact of the legislation change in 1999 choosing a di®erence-in-di®erences approach. He
determines slight evidence for threshold e®ects a®ecting ¯rms just below the exemption level.
Robustness checks (using di®erent subsamples such as East and West Germany, services and
manufacturing, and di®ering time frames) corroborate these results. Still, Verick (2004) em-
phasises that ¯ndings have to be taken with care as extending the observation period hints at
6The latter act was modi¯ed in a rather complicated way lifting the threshold to 20 employees in 2000.
7Approximations regarding the number of part-time employees may a®ect ¯rms di®erently and lead to a
"widespread dispersion" of ¯rms that lie just at the threshold in reality.
7other macroeconomic factors than the PADA a®ecting treatment and control group di®erently.
Verick (2004) motivates this lack of evidence with potential information de¯cits on behalf of the
employer (with respect to exact legislation). One limitation, however, is the fact that Verick
(2004) restricts his analysis to the examination of threshold e®ects, but does not examine the
hiring and ¯ring behaviour of ¯rms a®ected directly by the PADA.
Bauer et al. (2004) evaluate both reforms in a two-step analysis with respect to the e®ects
on job and worker °ows of ¯rms around the threshold. The data for this study is drawn from
the German Statistics Employment Register("BeschÄ aftigtenstatistik"). Based on this source,
Bauer et al. (2004) draw a 5% random sample of West German establishments only. The
authors observe employment behaviour of ¯rms in a twelve months observation window before
and after the legislation changes in 1996 and 1999 accounting thereby for potential strategic
behaviour. Bauer et al. (2004) then compute average worker and job °ows for each estimation
window aggregating the individual-level data.
In the ¯rst step, Bauer et al. (2004) examine threshold e®ects along the establishment
size, i.e. along the cross-sectional dimension. Estimating a model (dependent variable: hiring,
separation, and job °ow rates, respectively) that includes establishment characteristics, vari-
ables ¯tting a parametric relationship between the outcome measure and establishment size,
and dummy variables for di®erent establishment sizes around the threshold, the authors deter-
mine contradictive evidence8. On the one hand, Bauer et al. (2004) ¯nd slight evidence that
¯rms operating below the threshold value have signi¯cantly larger hiring and separation rates
compared to other ¯rm size groups (even though no e®ect is found on the overall job °ow). On
the other hand, ¯rms at the threshold value also exhibit excessive (and signi¯cant) hiring rates,
which contradicts the hypothesis of ¯rms trying to avoid the provisions of the PADA. Bauer et
al. (2004) interpret the latter ¯nding as potential replacement hires since the overall e®ect on
job °ows at the threshold is negative and signi¯cant.
In a second step, Bauer et al. (2004) also exploit time-series variation using a di®erence-
in-di®erences approach: they obtain an additional estimator ±DiD that captures the unique
e®ect of establishments subject to treatment (i.e. a®ected by the policy change). Surprisingly,
though, they do not ¯nd evidence for any signi¯cant threshold e®ects, neither in the ¯rst nor
in the second reform. This result does not change as Bauer et al. (2004) run several robustness
checks varying (i) ¯rm size control groups to test for missed out shocks and (ii) stratifying
according to industries to adjust for heterogeneous treatment e®ects.
A rather comprehensive approach to the e®ects of the PADA is taken by Bothfeld,
Bradtke, Kimmich, Schneider, Ullmann, and Pfarr (2005). The authors conduct a multistage
8All variables were allowed to °oat in the observation window.
8analysis in an attempt to investigate the e®ects of the PADA. Running several probit re-
gressions, they do not determine any particularly negative "psychological e®ects" of dismissal
protection on the hiring behaviour of ¯rms. Evaluating dismissal costs to be modest, Bothfeld
et al. (2005) therefore conclude that the PADA itself and the threshold value in particular
seemingly had no negative e®ect on ¯rms' employment behaviour. There are, however, several
critical aspects with respect to this study. As above, one may criticise the methodological ap-
proach itself, which builds on survey data susceptible to strategic answering and measurement
errors. This argument applies in particular as the reference point dates back by almost ¯ve
years. Secondly, the headcount computation is fairly approximative as the authors are not able
to di®erentiate between full-time and part-time employees. Even though Bothfeld et al. (2005)
acknowledge this fact, they do not explicitly account for it in the ¯nal interpretation of their
results. Moreover, computing the hirings rate, Bothfeld et al. (2005) compare the employment
level of each ¯rm at the time of the interview (2003) to the average employment level of the
past ¯ve years (1998-2003). Besides the issue of °uctuations in this vast time span, the frame
also comprises the legislation change in 1999, which is likely to have altered the employment
behaviour. Another critical aspect concerns the evaluation of costs regarding dismissals. Both-
feld et al. (2005) base their argumentation on severance pay and the length of trials exclusively,
neglecting thereby important aspects, which are not re°ected by these costs (e.g. expenses
regarding legal counselling, reduced productivity of the claimant).
Burgert (2006) disentangles e®ects of the PADA regulations with respect to the elderly
workforce as these employees are granted speci¯c provisions (explicitly and implicitly). The re-
sults that are derived, however, do not display any signi¯cant evidence towards a more cautious
employment behaviour regarding the elderly workforce (50 and above). The author interprets
this ¯nding as evidence against the hypothesis of the PADA as a barrier to greater employment
dynamics. Besides the issue of misclassi¯cations due to the narrow de¯nition of ¯rm classes
mentioned9, however, there is an issue of self-selection in his study: Burgert (2006) explicitly
restricts his sample to ¯rms that expected pro¯ts in at least one year, but never reported neg-
ative revenue expectations arguing that these ¯rms were not supposed to be guided by any
threshold values (and thus satis¯ed the stable unit assumption). This, obviously, limits the
validity of his results since those ¯rms that are expanding will presumably bother least about
the threshold.
Summarising the body of empirical literature regarding the "German case", there is
only modest evidence for e®ects of the PADA on outcomes such as employment mobility or
¯rm growth. We argue, however, that this lack of evidence can, at least partly, be attributed
9This issue applies only marginally since Burgert (2006) runs several robustness checks widening the ¯rm
groups without revealing any substantial changes in his results.
9to the fact that the aggregate approach of previous studies is unable to capture the complexity
of legislation as well as the heterogeneity of economic e®ects:
² First, aggregate measures cannot di®erentiate between newly begun and ongoing employ-
ment spells. While provisions actually did change for short-term spells, the latter were
granted a transition period and thus remained una®ected by the reforms (see Table 1 for
an illustration).
² Moreover, the setup of these studies implied a categorisation of ¯rm size at the beginning
of the observation period not accounting for switches between treatment and control group
during observation.
² Finally, previous research was unable to capture the contradictive e®ects implied by eco-
nomic theory: dismissal protection may lead to a duality in the labour market (Saint-
Paul, 1996) with a share of employees hired on "atypical" contracts facing high job
turnover, but a core workforce on permanent contracts bene¯tting from increased job
security. Similarly, employers may alter their overall matching behaviour dismissing
unproductive job-worker matches at the end of the waiting period before employment
protection applies. This may o®set the protective e®ect of employment protection on
aggregate hiring and separation rates.
4 The Data
The dataset used in this study is the German LIAB provided by the Institute of Employment
Research (IAB) of the Federal Employment Agency. It is generated linking administrative data
of the IAB containing individual-level information such as age, sex, employment characteristics
etc. with the IAB establishment panel containing annual information about establishment
characteristics and ¯rm decisions in the period ranging from 1993 up to 2001 (Alda, Bender, and
Gartner, 2005). The individual-level data stems from the "BeschÄ aftigten-LeistungsempfÄ anger-
Historik-Datei", which draws information from the mandatory noti¯cation procedure for the
health, pension and unemployment insurances. By contrast, the IAB establishment panel is a
representative annual survey of establishments (KÄ olling, 2000).
Regarding the speci¯c version used in this study, the LIAB contains interviews for
roughly 4,200 Eastern (2,100) and Western (2,100) German establishments. The observation
period ranges from 1991 (West Germany) and 1992 (East Germany), respectively, until 2001.
A person is included in the dataset if his employment lasts at least one day in one of the
longitudinal establishments in the period 1996 to 2001. Firms in the longitudinal version of
the LIAB are de¯ned as ¯rms that had regular (annual) interviews during the period 1999 to
102001. For the purpose of our analysis, however, we required ¯rms to stay in the sample for the
entire observation period ranging from 1996 to 2001, which applied to 2,356 ¯rms. The reason
is that we could be sure to observe all employment relationships only for these ¯rms. However,
this was crucial to our research design. This reduced the overall number of observations to
roughly 90,000, which then further shrunk in the selection process described below. Note that
newly founded establishments and establishments that dropped out of the market during the
observation period are not included in our data.
Concerning person- and ¯rm-speci¯c selection, we only considered individuals that had
the o±cial status of an employee. This excludes self-employed, non-employed owners, home-
workers etc., who are explicitly exempted from the computation (Article 17 para. 5 KSchG). We
also neglect sideline employments as these spells often occur within the same ¯rm or correspond
to marginal employment relationships ("geringfÄ ugige BeschÄ aftigungsverhÄ altnisse"). Similarly,
individuals that had started their employment on vocational training were not of particular
interest from a matching point of view and therefore dropped. Other subgroups excluded from
the analysis comprised interns, disabled employees, and individuals currently serving civil or
military duties.
We consider employees aged between 15 and 65 years10. Employees working for the
government (regional or federal level) have been removed from the sample as workers from
these institutions are often subject to di®erent treatment compared to their counterparts from
the private sector. Regarding the selection of speci¯c industries, we decided to exclude ¯rms
operating in the aviation or the navy sector due special regulations that apply in these industries
(Article 23 para. 1 KSchG). Furthermore, we removed ¯rms from the agricultural or mining
industry as these sectors are highly subsidised and prone to employ a large fraction of FTC-
workers (agriculture).
Since we are interested in the potential e®ect of treatment (i.e. the hazard change for an
individual spell), we did not only consider the number of full-time equivalent employees at the
time of dismissal, but each time potential treatment changed for the ¯rm. This also implied
splitting episodes into subspells if new workers were appointed to the ¯rm. Aggregating all
spells of a ¯rm at each splitting point provided us with the actual ¯rm size at these points in
time11.
Another issue to be addressed was the actual computation of the headcount itself: the
LIAB does provide detailed information on the job position only for those employees with a
10Potential problems arising from e.g. early retirement schemes should become obsolete as long as these speci¯c
age groups were distributed evenly across the sample.
11Note that our methodology even allowed to account for replacement hires appropriately since terminated spells
are, in line with legislation, included in the computation. By such action, we hold the level of employment
constant even if workers are substituted only after a certain period of time.
11full-time position. Part-time employees are gathered qualitatively, i.e. whether they have been
working less or more than a regular full-time employee. Unfortunately, the hours grid utilised
in the LIAB does not fully match the weighting scheme in the PADA. Weighting therefore had
to be adapted approximatively.
As in Boockmann and Ste®es (2007), we follow the noti¯cations for the failure event
provided by the LIAB (see Table 4). Due to its mandatory character, this information is deemed
reliable. A crucial point, however, concerned uncoded breaks in the individuals' employment
history. Rarely, the exact reasons for employment gaps were coded, which could relate to pure
inconsistencies in the dataset, but also mark the end of a particular employment relationship.
Again adhering to Boockmann and Ste®es (2007), we approximatively de¯ned employment
spells to be uninterrupted if the employee did return to his or her old ¯rm within 90 days
after the break (without being on bene¯ts). Spells that did not su±ce these conditions were
marked as censored (Table 4). The exception we allowed for consisted of interruptions due to
parental leave or compulsory duties (e.g. compulsory o±cial duty), which were also treated as
uninterrupted employment relationships. In the former as well as in the latter case, the spell
continues to contribute to the regular number of sta® and thus still enters the computation of
headcount. Therefore, we decided to close employment gaps for these individuals recognising
that this may lead to a potential measurement error12.
5 Estimation Approach
The question to be resolved empirically is the e®ect of employment protection on newly begun
employment relationships. Additional ¯ring costs implied by the law are likely to reduce the
number of separations. However, since there is a waiting period of 6 months during which
employment protection does not apply, the protective e®ect of the law should unfold only after
that date. From job matching theory, there is an argument why one could observe even more
separations before. At six months of duration, the employer has to consider either ¯ring the
worker at relatively low costs or retaining the worker and face higher ¯ring costs if it wishes
to ¯re the worker at some later period. At this moment, we should observe a larger number of
dismissals with employment protection than without13. Since the e®ect of dismissal protection
may, therefore, be reversed over the employment spell, it needs to be estimated at di®erent job
durations.
As an estimator, we use a di®erence-in-di®erences (DiD) model. This setup has been
widely used in empirical research over the last decade (Abadie, 2005). Comparing changes
12Permanent employees on parental leave could be replaced by temporary workers on ¯xed-term contracts.
13This argument has been formalised in a job matching model by (Boockmann and Hagen, 2007)
12in job stability in the "treated" fraction of spells exposed to employment protection to an
"untreated" control group can be used to identify the "true" e®ect of the PADA on employment
stability.
As displayed in Table 3, we sampled spells beginning after 1st October 1996 but before
1st October 1997 for the ¯rst interval and, respectively, after 1st March 1999 and before 1st
March 2000 for the second period allowing thereby for a minimum follow-up time of 365 days.
Firms with 11 to 14 employees formed our initial control group. To check robustness, we use
¯rms with 1 to 5 employees as a second control group. In order to be classi¯ed as treatment
or control group, spells had to be in either of the speci¯ed groups at the spell begin. Thus, we
allowed for a change of treatment in the aftermath.
For the construction of the intervals before and after the policy change, a °ow sampling
approach was chosen. This avoids the issue of length-bias. That is to say, we sample individuals
who enter the state of employment (the "starting time") at some point during the interval (0; b],
and then measure elapsed time for a certain follow-up period. The sampling period and the
follow-up time had to be de¯ned according to the constraints imposed by the interim period
between the two legislation changes: for the start of the ¯rst interval, we did not consider
any "bu®er" to account for adjustment e®ects immediately as legislation granted a transition
period for existing spells that was expected to expire only on September 1999. Hence, we set
the starting date of the ¯rst sampling interval to 1st October 1996 (i.e. the day the modi¯ed
bill came into e®ect).
De¯ning the end of the frame was more di±cult. To avoid the problem of Ashenfelter's
Dip (Ashenfelter, 1978), we had to restrict the sampling period. Even though legislation only
changed on 1st January 1999, the general elections for the Bundestag took already place on 27th
September 199814. Still, we consider a bu®er period of three months to be su±cient to account
for Ashenfelter's Dip since this date only marks the utmost observation point of a spell. We
have therefore set the maximum observation date to be 1st October 1998 (see Table 3).
Another critical point subject to speci¯cation changes was the censoring time. We
decided to determine ¯xed censoring dates to allow for the longest tracking time possible.
Obviously, times at risk could potentially di®er across groups as we sample spells within the
intervals. We therefore proceeded as follows: ¯rst, we de¯ned a minimum time for spells
to evolve without entering the period immediately before the legislation change. In order
to balance the trade-o® between a wider sampling window, on the one hand, and a longer
tracking time, on the other, we varied these minimum follow-up times to last 274 and 365 days,
14According to contemporary reports, the landslide victory of the social democrats and thereby the change of
the PADA (which was a key feature of their campaign) were easily foreseeable.
13respectively (Table 3)15. Since spells that started before the ¯nal sampling point potentially
exceeded this minimum duration, we then compared the maximum follow-up times of all groups
and de¯ned the shortest to be the maximum tracking time. This method allowed to compare
the actual survivor functions at each point in time, which, given equation (1), was crucial for
the computation of the DiD estimator. Clearly, with spells failing over time, the DiD estimator
becomes unstable and imprecise. However, bootstrapped con¯dence intervals should account
for this e®ect.
Since the key purpose is to investigate the e®ects of PADA on individual employment
stability at di®erent durations, we use survival analysis as the most °exible approach. In
particular, we use the time varying unconditional e®ect obtained from Kaplan-Meier Survivor
functions. The Kaplan-Meier survivor function indicates the probability of remaining in em-
ployment after ¿ days of employment. The DiD e®ect is thus given by
DiD(¿) = [^ Si=1;t=1(¿) ¡ ^ Si=1;t=1(¿)] ¡ [^ Si=0;t=1(¿) ¡ ^ Si=0;t=0(¿)] (1)
where ^ Si;t(¿) denotes the empirical Survivor Function, i denotes the treatment e®ect (i = 1
indicates treatment), and t refers to the period before and after the legislation change (t =
1 corresponds to the post legislation change period). Equation (1) implies that the causal
e®ect is estimated for every point in time ¿. This is convenient as it allows the legislation
change to have a potentially di®ering impact over time. In order to judge the signi¯cance of
our estimator, we use an ordinary nonparametric bootstrap with 200 resamples (Efron and
Tibsharani, 1993).
The identifying assumption in this context requires that, in absence of treatment, the
outcomes for both groups follow equal paths over time (parallel trends). This assumption
requires careful justi¯cation. In our case, there are the following reasons why the parallel
trends assumption could be violated:
² Most obviously, changes to other regulations could a®ect treatment and control group
di®erently.
² Economic conditions such as the business cycle could have a di®erential impact.
² The assignment to treatment and control could be endogenous if, for instance, ¯rms shrink
deliberately in order to be exempted from employment protection.
Concerning the ¯rst point, there were no other major exogenous changes in labour market regu-
lations during the observation period that potentially a®ected groups di®erently. For instance,
after October 1996, no major modi¯cations to the legislation of ¯xed-term contracts became
15Thereby, we were able to check the robustness of our results as amplifying the sampling window increased
the number of spells included in the analysis, but, at the same time, diminished the tracking period.
14e®ective until January 2001 ("Gesetz Ä uber Teilzeitarbeit und befristete ArbeitsvertrÄ age"). Sim-
ilarly, the Works Constitution Act was altered at the end of 2001, leaving its threshold values,
however, unchanged16. The cut-o® level of 14 employees was chosen as other threshold values
become applicable once ¯rm size exceeds the 15 employees17.
A di®erential e®ect of other variables on ¯rms in the treatment and control group is
the more likely, the more dissimilar these groups are. We have restricted this study to small-
sized businesses, i.e. ¯rms with an initial number of 14 full-time equivalent employees at most.
These ¯rms are likely to be driven by similar economic forces as our treatment group. To
verify this, Bauer et al. (2004) examine establishments of di®erent ¯rm classes with respect
to the overall macroeconomic environment during the time of the policy change. The authors
compare insolvency frequencies by ¯rm classes (<5; 6¡10; 11¡20; 21¡50) together with GDP,
but do not ¯nd substantial di®erences among ¯rm categories (except for ¯rms with less than
¯ve employees). Since we use a balanced sample from the same source of data for our approach,
their ¯ndings should also apply to our analysis.
Concerning the third point, problems may arise due to strategic behaviour of ¯rms
from the control group, which may violate the parallel trend assumption. That is, in order to
avoid the provisions of the PADA for new hirings, ¯rms above the threshold of ten full-time
equivalents could have deliberately reduced employment below this value before the reform in
1999. Once the threshold was changed, ¯rms should have ceased such behaviour. Judging from
the summary statistics in Table 5, however, does not really support this argument.
Potential information de¯cits as outlined by Verick (2004) could mark another source of
measurement error. Since ¯rms in Germany are a mandatory member of the chamber of crafts
or the chamber of industry and commerce, which o®er legal advice free of charge, we consider
this only a minor issue18.
Another problem not related to the di®erence-in-di®erences procedure may be that legis-
lation a®ects both hirings and separations. For instance, employers may hire more restrictively
after the introduction of employment protection. In a job matching model, the reservation
match quality, below which an employer does not hire a worker, may increase. As the number
of hirings decreases, so does the number of subsequent separations.
While this is a plausible mechanism19, we note that this behaviour is unlikely due to the
16One should keep in mind, however, that we cannot entirely rule out interactions with existing threshold values
(see Table 2).
17For instance, until September 2000, ¯rms with more than 16 employees were required to allocate 6% of all job
positions to disabled employees (Severe Disability Act). If the employer failed to comply with this regulation,
he was ¯ned a monthly penalty of 200 DM per vacancy.
18Indeed, one may assume that a majority of ¯rms will consult these institutions before appointing new em-
ployees.
19However, a number of studies suggest no e®ects on hirings, see e.g. (Bauer et al., 2004).
15fact that there remains a 6-months waiting period before employment protection takes e®ect.
Therefore, the employer will assess match quality not only at the start of the employment spell,
but also at 6 months after the start, at which time unproductive workers are shed. We can,
therefore, use the 6 months waiting period to identify empirically the e®ects of separations
vis-µ a-vis hirings.
Finally, a problem that may bias our results and that needs to be considered when
interpreting the ¯ndings is non-random panel mortality (Burgert, 2006). As we restricted our
analysis to ¯rms that stayed in the sample over the entire observation period ranging from 1996
to 2001, we do neglect those ¯rms that entered into or dropped out of the market during this
period. If exit from the sample is correlated with the treatment status, i.e. applicability of the
PADA and the additional dismissal costs involved in the legislation, then this may represent a
serious issue, which needs to be kept in mind when interpreting our results.
6 The Results
Turning to the discussion of the results, we start with speci¯cation (2) from Table 3 in the
appendix. This speci¯cation will form the basis of our analysis. We will, however, also draw on
results from other speci¯cations to contrast or support certain issues. We start with the uncon-
ditional Kaplan-Meier curves in Figure 2. Median duration is at 396 and 390 days regarding
speci¯cations (2) and (4), respectively (without Table). This is somewhat lower than in the
results found in other studies (e.g. Boockmann and Ste®es, 2005). The di®erence may be due
to the fact that we concentrate on small establishments in this paper. It may also re°ect the
inclusion of young workers below the age of 25.
Evidently, after an initial period of almost synchronised sloping, the curves diverge
substantially. This gap even widens as time passes and remains at a level of roughly 10%
after 400 days. Strikingly, the treatment & before20 line constantly runs below the other curves
indicating increased drop-outs after the ¯rst 200 days of duration21. This suggests that job exit
occurs earliest in small companies exempted from employment protection.
Associating this observation with the context of theory, we obtain the following picture:
for the initial 180 days of tenure, all four subgroups are exempted from the PADA since either
legislation was not applicable at all (treatment & before) or it only becomes applicable after a
waiting period. Thus, ¯rms in all groups have equal legal rights to dismiss workers, which is
re°ected in similar survivor functions. After the end of the waiting period, however, provisions
20To facilitate the comparison with the ¯gures in the appendix, we use identical labels to those depicted in the
graphs.
21Formal log-rank tests clearly reject the equality of survivor curves yielding Â2-statistics of 18.24.
16of the PADA become applicable to all groups except for ¯rms of treatment & before. This is in
line with the observation of increased stability for spells in the groups covered by the PADA (as
employers had to dismiss bad matches during probation), unlike in treatment & before.
This interpretation is supported by the second graph in Figure 2 displaying speci¯ca-
tion (4) with 1 to 5 employees as control group22. Again, we observe a fairly synchronised
trend during the ¯rst 180 to 200 days and diversion thereafter23. Although the e®ect is less
pronounced, the interpretation is similar as in the ¯rst case. Only treatment & after was af-
fected by the provisions of the PADA, while the other groups remained below the threshold of
applicability. This translates into stability the same way as before, this time, however, with
treatment & after lying above the other curves indicating increased stability for those spells
covered by the PADA.
Even though the graphed survivor curves give detailed insight into the particular e®ects
on each group, they are not able to reveal the overall impact of the reform and its signi¯cance.
Therefore, we construct the DiD estimator as outlined in section 5.
Examining both graphs from Figure 3 reveals a relatively clear-cut picture, which ¯ts
well with our expectations. Regarding the evolution of the survivor curve in Figure 2a, we
observe a relatively stable period at the beginning lasting roughly 180 days. Thereafter, we
notice a steep increase in the estimated e®ect, which amounts to a rise of about 10% in the
survival probability from approximately one year of job duration. Moreover, whereas the initial
phase does not turn out to be signi¯cant at any reasonable level, we ¯nd the latter e®ect to be
signi¯cant at the 5% level. This emphasises the positive e®ect of the PADA on job stability
after the waiting period, which does not fade out but remains at a constant level.
Regarding the second graph, applicability of the PADA seems to be associated with a
"shedding period" indicated by the negative e®ect at start. This is in line with the idea that
employers dismiss more workers within the waiting period if they are subject to employment
after this period. The negative e®ect on survival is followed by a positive shift of the survival
probability after 180 days, amounting to greater stability of roughly 4 to 10 percentage points.
The latter e®ect again corresponds to the assumption of bad matches being already dissolved
during probation. Both "segments" in this graph are, however, not signi¯cant at the 5%
level.
Taken together, we do ¯nd signi¯cant evidence for an increase in overall stability of
spells once the PADA becomes applicable. Regarding speci¯cation (4), we also ¯nd that this
22Note that survivor functions of the treatment group in both speci¯cations do not coincide as we allow for
switches between treatment and control group. That is, spells that started initially in the control group may
have changed into the ¯rm class with 6 to 10 employees attributing thereby to the treatment group.
23Log-rank tests reject equality with Â2-statistics equal to 14.46.
17positive impact is "preluded" by a slightly negative impact at start (although not signi¯cant),
hinting at excessive shedding. This pattern could imply a quicker dissolution of bad matches,
while productive job-worker relationships actually face a higher persistence in the long run.
The fact that we observe a similar pattern in both speci¯cations a±rms our conjecture that
these e®ects are a result of changing e®ects of the PADA on stability.
In order to further test the robustness of our results with respect to the di®erent shares
of ¯rms employing ¯xed-term contract workers (Table 5 and 6), which may potentially violate
the parallel trend assumption, we delete all ¯rms using this form of atypical labour from the
sample. We acknowledge that excluding these ¯rms may raise a selection issue if establishments
with FTCs were to display a di®erent overall separation or employment behaviour (compared to
¯rms without these workers). Since this procedure only serves to countercheck the robustness
of our results, however, we consider the approach to be appropriate in this context.
Dropping ¯rms employing FTC workers, we observe a slight downward shift (which
even crosses the zero line) during probation in Figure 2c. Remarkably, the steep increase after
the expiry of probation has now become more pronounced. After these e®ects, however, we
¯nd the trend almost unchanged, but again signi¯cant at a 5% level. Changing to ¯rms with
1 to 5 employees as control group (Figure 2d) does reveal a decrease at start that becomes
particularly visible at roughly 180 days24. This e®ect is followed by a downward shift that is
most pronounced at medium duration. Both e®ects are insigni¯cant, though.
From this sensitivity check, we do not ¯nd that results are substantially di®erent after
excluding ¯rms with FTC spells. This hints to the presumption that a potential bias due to
di®ering shares of establishments employing FTCs may only play a minor role in our context.
While the more pronounced initial shedding phase appears to be fairly in line with evidence
provided by Boockmann and Hagen (2007), the di®erences are by no means signi¯cant.
7 Conclusion
In this study, we have examined the e®ects of changes in German dismissal protection legislation
on individual employment stability exploiting a legislative reform in January 1999 as "natural
experiment". We have restricted ourselves to the evaluation of short-term spells since only these
employment relationships were a®ected by the policy change. Tracking spells individually over
time, we have also been able to capture di®erences in the application of legislation with respect
to job duration due to the existence of a waiting period.
24Note that extra care has to be taken when interpreting the graphs of speci¯cation (4) in the appendix as the
scaling is not identical. Examining Figure 2d without con¯dence bands reveals that the e®ect at 180 days
is smaller by roughly 2 percentage points.
18Using the LIAB, a linked employer-employee dataset for Germany, we have found a
signi¯cant increase in job stability for employment relationships covered by the PADA after the
waiting period of 180 days. Using a di®erent control group of establishments, however, indicates
a certain lack of robustness for this e®ect. Before the waiting period, job exits occur with equal
frequency regardless of whether an establishment is exempt from employment protection. In
line with the idea of increased labour shedding during the waiting period, there is a slightly
negative e®ect on stability at start. However, the e®ect is never signi¯cant.
Our study has provided only ¯rst insights into the e®ects of dismissal protection legis-
lation on the e®ects of employment protection on the evolvement of job stability over tenure.
Avoiding methodological shortcomings of previous research, a more detailed glance at job dura-
tions reveals some evidence for e®ects of the German PADA. However, the issue requires further
investigation in the future. In particular, one may adjust for covariates in estimating survival
probabilities to check for the in°uence of selection on observable variables. One might also use
spells with long durations as a further control group, resulting in a di®erence-in-di®erences-
in-di®erences design. Finally, it is also desirable to take a second look at changes in hirings
behaviour as a consequence of employment protection in further research.
8 Appendix
Table 1: Key Changes in the Provisions of the
PADA before and after 1999
Before After
Applicability:
>10 employees >5 employees
Weighting Scheme:
<10 hours ¡ 0.25
<20 hours ¡ 0.5 <20 hours ¡ 0.5
<30 hours ¡ 0.75 <30 hours ¡ 0.75
>30 hours ¡ 1 >30 hours ¡ 1
Transition Period:
Old provisions to ongoing None









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 5: Sample Speci¯cations (2)





















No. of Firms with FTCs
fs1-5 - -
fs6-10 32 (.23)2 46 (.26)
fs11-14 17 (.27) 31 (.36)
Total 49 (.24) 77 (.29)
No. of Firms changing
1-5 ! 6-10 12 22
6-10 ! 1-5 33 56
6-10 ! 11-14 45 (28)3 69 (45)
11-14 ! 6-10 49 (32) 71 (39)
11-14 $ 6-10 33 56
1 Single categories may not add up to the total as some censor-
ings and failures occurred in ¯rms with more than 14 employ-
ees.
2 As share of the total number of ¯rms in that category.
3 No. of ¯rms changing that originated in that particular ¯rm
class.
23Table 6: Sample Speci¯cations (4)





















No. of Firms with FTCs
fs1-5 29 (.20)2 26 (.14)
fs6-10 26 (.22) 41 (.26)
fs11-14 - -
Total 55 (.21) 67 (.19)
No. of Firms changing
1-5 ! 6-10 37 (28)3 51 (29)
6-10 ! 1-5 44 (27) 65 (44)
6-10 ! 11-14 33 54
11-14 ! 6-10 23 39
11-14 $ 6-10 26 42
1 Single categories may not add up to the total as some censor-
ings and failures occurred in ¯rms with more than 14 employ-
ees.
2 As share of the total number of ¯rms in that category.
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